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ABSTRACT  
In many countries significant amounts of public funding are devoted to 
supporting firms’ R&D and innovation projects. Here, using panel data on 
the innovation activities of Irish manufacturing firms we examine the legacy 
effects of public subsidies for new product development and R&D. We 
examine five alternative mechanisms through which such effects may 
occur: input additionality, output additionality, and congenital, inter-
organisational and experiential behavioural additionality. Tests suggest 
contrasting legacy effects with R&D subsidies generating legacy output 
additionality effects while new product development subsidies have legacy 
congenital and inter-organisational behavioural additionality effects. Our 
results have implications for innovation policy design and evaluation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
In many countries significant amounts of public funding are devoted to 
supporting private firms’ R&D and innovation projects through subsidies or 
grants (Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012), loans, and other instruments 
such as loan guarantees or R&D tax credits (Schoening et al., 1998, 
Trajtenberg, 2001). In general, these interventions are justified on the basis 
of the market failure (Dasgupta and David, 1994) in which the inability of 
firms to appropriate all of the benefits of R&D investment results in under-
investment relative to the socially optimum.i Evaluations of the 
effectiveness of these various forms of public support for private R&D and 
innovation have generally demonstrated positive results in terms of the 
scale of private R&D investments and innovation outputs (Hsu et al., 2009, 
Licht, 2003, Luukkonen, 2000).  
Yet issues remain in our understanding of the effect of public subsidies on 
private innovation, predominantly in terms of the mechanisms through 
which firms benefit from innovation subsidies, and the period over which 
subsidies continue to have an effect on business innovation. This is despite 
the fact that evaluations of innovation support measures have become 
more sophisticated, for example in allowing for the impact of selection bias 
(Duguet, 2004, Aerts and Schmidt, 2008, Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2009), 
and applying experimental approaches (Reiner, 2011, Bakhshi et al., 
2012). Evaluations remain dominated by a short-term focus, however, and 
an over-emphasis on resource-effects (input additionality) and results-
effects (output additionality) with little attention to longer-term learning 
effects. The short-term horizons, implicit in many innovation policy 
evaluations are particularly disappointing given the relatively long periods 
which are often needed for innovations to achieve scale in the market 
place. For example, recent UK guidelines on the evaluation of publicly 
funded innovation projects suggest adopting a three-year period for the 
persistence of benefits in individual enterprise support measures (BIS, 
2009, p. 26). Short-term evaluations may also under-estimate the longer-
term benefits of innovation support measures through their organisational 
learning effects (Bartezzaghi et al., 1997, Clarysse et al., 2009, Cohen and 
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Levinthal, 1989, Jimenez-Jimenez and Sanz-Valle, 2011), and/or wider 
innovation spillovers (Beugelsdijck and Cornet, 2001).  Not capturing these 
longer-term, or legacy, effects may lead to the benefits of such initiatives 
being underestimated and subsequently an under-investment in innovation 
policy. Where such ‘policy failure’ occurs this may exacerbate the standard 
‘market failure’ which leads firms to under-invest in R&D and innovation 
due to their inability to appropriate the positive externalities of R&D and 
innovation (Martin and Scott, 2000, Woolthuis et al., 2005). Alternatively, 
adopting a short-term perspective may lead to an over-estimation of policy 
effects where short-term benefits are not sustained in the longer-term 
(Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2011).  
In this paper we are interested in the additionality effects of public 
subsidies for private-sector innovation. Specifically, we are concerned not 
only with those aspects of additionality which have been widely researched 
to date, i.e. input and output additionality, but also with identifying firm-level 
learning effects from innovation support as measured through behavioural 
additionality (Buiseret et al., 1995). This addresses an identified weakness 
in the literature with Clarysse et al (2009. 1518) stating  that ‘the concept of 
behavioural additionality has not really been tested in empirical studies.  As 
such, it has remained a rather anecdotal observation, without much 
academic work to underpin its existence or to explain the mechanisms 
through which it was affected’. Our interest is in exploring the mechanisms 
through which additionality occurs and also recognising that ‘while input 
and output additionality operate at a point in time, behavioural additionality 
effects may be expected to endure beyond the period of R&D and to be 
integrated into the general capabilities of the firm’ (Georghiou, 2004, 4).  
We therefore adopt a long-term perspective in evaluating the legacy effects 
of public subsidies for private innovation.   
Our paper adds to existing knowledge on the effects of public subsidies for 
innovation in three ways. First, recognising that assessment of the different 
mechanisms through which behavioural additionality occurs are not well 
developed and tested (an exception is that by Clarysse et al 2009), we 
contribute to the evidence on this from an organisational learning 
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perspective. Second, with most additionality assessments focusing on the 
short-term (Cunningham et al, 2013) we assess not only how behavioural 
additionality occurs in the longer-term, but also consider the legacy effects 
of input and output additionality.  Thirdly, we consider separately the 
potentially different legacy effects of public support for R&D and that for 
new product development.  
Our analysis is based on panel data on Irish manufacturing firms, and we 
focus on the legacy effects of public innovation subsidies at the level of the 
plant. For example, do publicly supported innovation projects generate 
behavioural effects which persist beyond the life of the supported project 
(Aschhoff and Fier, 2005, Clarysse et al., 2009, Falk, 2004, Georghiou, 
2004, Kim and Song, 2007)? Or, do publicly supported innovations made in 
one period provide an enhanced basis for innovation in subsequent periods 
through quality-ladder type effects (Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2009)? 
Evidence of either would suggest significant legacy effects; evidence of 
neither would suggest that the effects of public support for innovation are 
time-limited to the duration of the project and leave no lasting legacy. Both 
scenarios have potentially significant policy implications. If there are legacy 
effects, the benefits of innovation policy should be incremental, creating 
steadily stronger innovating firms, and a strong argument for policy 
intervention. If additionality is transient the case for innovation policy 
intervention is weaker.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
evaluation literature outlining the alternative mechanisms through which 
legacy effects might result and how these might affect innovation 
performance in the post-subsidy period. Section 3 describes the data used 
in our empirical analysis – the Irish Innovation Panel – and the 
operationalization of our tests for legacy effects. The tests we propose rely 
on the notion of the innovation production function, and the intuition that, 
due to organisational learning, firms which received public support for 
innovation in a previous period may derive more innovation value from 
innovation inputs in subsequent periods than firms which had received no 
prior support. Section 4 of the paper outlines the main empirical results and 
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Section 5 concludes with a range of conceptual and policy implications.  
2. DIMENSIONS OF ADDITIONALITY 
Central to the rationale for public policy intervention to support innovation is 
the notion of ‘additionality’, i.e. the extent to which additional innovation 
activity is stimulated by public support (Buiseret et al., 1995, Luukkonen, 
2000, Georghiou, 2004). This rationale is based mainly on a neo-classical 
economics perspective, premised on the notion that additional innovation 
activity will in turn lead to greater innovation spillovers than would have 
occurred in the absence of public support (Beugelsdijck and Cornet, 2001, 
Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2012, De Bondt, 1996). Assessment of the 
effectiveness of public support has therefore mirrored this rationale and 
concentrated on measuring additionality in terms of firms’ resources (input 
additionality) and innovation results (output additionality) (Falk 2007)1.  This 
has been supplemented in some instances by an assessment of pure and 
rent-based spillovers to other non-supported organisations (Griliches, 
1995), or what Autio et al (2008) refer to as “second-order additionality”2.    
Other perspectives, notably organisational and learning theories, have 
increasingly emphasised that this neo-classical approach does not capture 
fully the behavioural effects of public support on firms’ innovation 
capabilities (Busisseret et al 1995, Georgiou 2002, Falk 2007, Clarysse et 
al., 2009, Hsu et al., 2009, Norrman and Bager-Sjogren, 2010, Afcha 
Chavez, 2011).  Indeed, Georgiou (1997, 2002) argues that public support 
is less significant in determining if a project will go-ahead, but rather in 
determining the scale, scope and speed of the project. As such, 
behavioural additionality occurs alongside other input and/or output 
                                                 
1 Input additionality adopts a resource-based perspective in examining the extent to which 
firms increase their private investment in R&D in response to public R&D subsidies (Falk 
2007). Output additionality adopts a results-based perspective (ibid.) in terms of the 
increase in innovation outputs i.e. patents, products etc. or innovation outcomes i.e. sales 
from new or modified products etc. arising from public support for R&D.    
2 First-order additionality is concerned with direct technological and learning outcomes of 
R&D subsidies whereas second-order additionality occurs through technological learning 
and innovation outcomes, typically arising through ‘knowledge spill-overs, technology 
diffusion, and knowledge exchanges within communities of firms’ (Autio et al, 2008, 59).   
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additionality effects. In other words, not only are short-term effects of public 
support reflected in the resources committed to a project (input 
additionality), or the results arising from a project (output additionality), but 
other complementary effects may also exist such as behavioural changes 
in the innovation process (behavioural additionality).  These behavioural 
changes may, however, be sustained beyond the lifetime of the project as 
learning effects are integrated and embedded in firms’ innovation routines 
and capabilities. In turn these learning effects may have positive longer-
term effects on innovation outcomes.   
There is substantial empirical evidence for the positive effect of public 
subsidies on short-term input and output additionality measures (see for 
example Aerts and Schmidt, 2008, Aschhoff and Fier, 2005, Buiseret et al., 
1995, Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006, Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2009, Hsu et 
al., 2009).  However, considerably fewer studies have attempted to assess 
behavioural additionality (Clarysse et al 2009, Georghiou, 2004). Part of 
the explanation for this is the ‘multi-layered’ (Georghiou 2004, 4) nature of 
behavioural additionality which makes it difficult to determine the 
mechanisms through which behavioural changes are evident, and the 
period of time over which their effect persists. Even less attention has been 
given to the legacy effects of additionality – whether for input, output or 
behavioural additionality – on longer-term innovation performance. In the 
following sections we therefore consider in more detail each type of 
additionality and their potential legacy effects.  
2.1 Input Additionality 
The expectation of input additionality is central to the neo-classical 
rationale for public support for innovation.  Here, resources are provided to 
firms to undertake activities that would not otherwise have occurred. Input 
additionality has therefore been understood as a quantitative measure, 
determined by ‘whether for every Euro provided in subsidy or other 
assistance, the firm spends at least an additional Euro on the target 
activity’ (Georghiou 2002, 1). Naturally this has simulated debate about the 
extent to which public investment acts as a complement to private 
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investment or as a substitute, crowding-out private expenditure (David et al 
2000).  Reviews of crowding-out effects (David et al 2000, Garcia-Quevdeo 
2004, Aerts and Schmidt 2008) find mixed results, although Aerts and 
Schmidt (2008) conclude that the majority of studies find little crowding out 
effect. 
Common to these empirical studies of crowding-out has been a focus on 
short-term effects. However, public subsidies may also lead to longer-term 
legacy effects which influence innovation outcomes in subsequent periods. 
This may occur where public support for innovation has a legacy of cost or 
quality impact on the in-house R&D resources which a firm has available 
and deploys.  For example, Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) found that R&D 
subsidies raised R&D intensity (i.e. R&D spend per unit of sales) from 2.3 
per cent to 6.4 per cent with potentially significant legacy impacts in terms 
of infrastructure or equipment. Therefore, public support in one period may 
enable a firm to invest in R&D infrastructure or equipment which may 
enhance the innovation value of future R&D investments. In other words, 
public innovation subsidies may lead to qualitative improvements in R&D 
capacity such that for every Euro invested by a firm in R&D in subsequent 
periods the innovation outputs are greater than those achieved by firms 
which did not previously receive public subsidies. This leads to our first 
proposition: 
Proposition 1: Past receipt of public subsidies for innovation will 
increase the innovation returns from current R&D investments. 
2.2 Output additionality 
Where innovation investment occurs there is an expectation of outputs or 
results (Falk, 2004). Output additionality relates to those outputs from the 
innovation process which would not have occurred in the absence of public 
subsidies (Luukkonen 2000, Georghiou 2002).  At least two difficulties have 
been identified relating to the identification and measurement of output 
additionality. First, the relationship between innovation investment and 
outputs is neither linear nor independent of other innovation investments.  
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For example, from a structuralist-evolutionary perspective Bach and Matt 
(2002) argue that there is not a direct and unambiguous relationship 
between innovation inputs and outputs. Similarly, Clarysse et al (2009) 
suggest the possibility that both intra- and inter-organisational knowledge 
spillovers may result from any innovation project creating difficulties in 
isolating the effects of public and private investments.  
Second, there is no universally accepted measure of innovation output 
additionality (Clarysse et al 2009). As with input additionality, assessments 
of output additionality have typically been quantitative including direct 
indicators such as patents, downstream indicators such as the share of 
sales from new and improved products, and also indirect indicators 
including value added, profitability etc. Virtually no consideration has been 
given to qualitative aspects of output additionality and how these might 
influence innovation outcomes over the longer-term.  For example, public 
subsidies for innovation may enable firms to introduce new, higher quality 
products or accelerate their NPD processes (Luukkonen, 2000). It may, 
however, take longer than the period during which public support is 
received to achieve these outputs and therefore short-term evaluations 
may underestimate project results. Even where these outputs are achieved 
in the funding period, the creation of more novel, more complex or more 
successful products than otherwise may have legacy effects leading to a 
‘quality ladder’ in subsequent periods (Grossman and Helpman, 1991)3. 
For example, Alecke et al. (2012) suggest that for firms receiving R&D 
subsidies in East Germany the probability of making related patent 
applications – an indication of innovation quality – rises from 20 to 40 per 
cent. The implication is that public innovation subsidies may generate 
legacy effects on future innovation outcomes through short-term 
improvements in technology or product cost which are greater in firms 
which received innovation subsidies. This suggests our second proposition: 
 
                                                 
3 Such quality ladder effects have been shown to be important in determining the duration 
of exporting (Chen, 2012). 
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Proposition 2: Past receipt of public subsidies for innovation will 
increase the value of past innovation as the basis for current 
innovation. 
In terms of the innovation production function this means that the 
relationship between current innovation outputs and lagged innovation 
outputs will be positively moderated by firms’ receipt of public subsidies in 
the previous period (Figure 1). 
2.3 Behavioural additionality 
In recent years, the range of potential effects that have been considered in 
evaluating the effectiveness of public subsidies for innovation has extended 
beyond quantitative indicators of input and output additionality to include 
potential effects on the innovation capabilities of the firm (Afcha Chavez, 
2011, Clarysse et al., 2009, Hsu et al., 2009, Norrman and Bager-Sjogren, 
2010). In the evaluation literature this is discussed in terms of behavioural 
additionality (Buisseret et al 1995, Davenport et al 1998, Georghiou 2002).  
However, a lack of consensus as to what is understood by the notion of 
behavioural additionality has led to a wide variety of assessment 
approaches (Cunningham et al 2013). Indeed the OECD’s (2006) pilot 
project identified seven dimensions of behavioural additionality ranging 
from project acceleration, scale and scope to the formation of collaborative 
networks and change in management practices. Roper et al. (2004) also 
conclude that innovation subsidies may lead to increments in firms’ private 
knowledge stock, development of firms’ capabilities for subsequent R&D 
productivity, and benefits arising from the commercial exploitation of R&D4.  
Recently, efforts to examine behavioural changes have drawn on an 
organisational learning perspective (Bontis 1998, Clarysse et al 2009, 
Knockaert et al 2013). Knockaert et al (2013), although focusing on the 
effect of intermediary organisations on firms’ innovation behaviour, 
consider behavioural additionality in terms of improvements in firms’ 
                                                 
4 Generally these changes are perceived as being desirable however there is also the 
potential for undesirable behaviours to emerge through, for example, inefficient routines, 
risk taking etc. 
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cognitive capacity (Bach and Matt 2002), defined as ‘the positive impact on 
competencies, expertise and networks’ (Knockaert et al 2013, 3).  These 
three dimensions of cognitive capacity mirror closely the approach adopted 
by Clarysse et al (2009) in examining the effect of direct public support 
(R&D subsidies) on organisational learning through congenital learning 
(competencies), experiential learning (expertise) and inter-organisational 
learning (networks). However, both of these studies of additionality draw on 
the well-established organisational learning literature with Bontis (1998) 
conceptualising intellectual capital in an organisation as the sum of: human 
capital i.e. congenital learning (Clarysse et al 2009) or competencies 
(Knockaert et al 2013); structural capital relating to the embedding of 
organisational knowledge through routines i.e. experiential learning 
(Clarysse et al 2009) or expertise (Knockaert et al 2013); and customer 
capital which Bontis (1998) refers to as knowledge embedded outside the 
firm and developed through inter-organisational learning (Clarysse et al 
2009, Knockaert et al 2013).  Following Clarysse et al (2009) we consider 
behavioural additionality through the lens of organisational learning, and 
discuss each of these three learning mechanisms (i.e. congenital, inter-
organisational and experiential) in turn. 
2.3.1 Congenital additionality  
Firms’ ‘cognitive capacity’ (Bach and Matt 2003, Knockaert et al 2013) is 
comprised of two dimensions: human capital which Bontis (1998, 65) refers 
to as ‘the sheer intelligence of the organizational members’ and inter-
organisational networks.  In order words, cognitive capacity refers to the 
internal knowledge (intellectual) stock in a firm and the enhancement of this 
through external knowledge networks. From an organisational learning 
perspective, congenital learning is then defined as the individual’s 
education and experience at the individual knowledge node, i.e. that 
internal to the mind of the employee (Bontis 1998). At the organisational 
level, the stock of human capital and the potential for congenital learning is 
therefore measured as the sum of employees’ education and experience.  
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Critical to our concern with behavioural additionality through organisational 
learning is the path dependent and cumulative nature of congenital 
learning.  A number of other studies have found evidence that public 
subsidies for innovation lead to more challenging research being 
undertaken.  For example, of those firms involved in the R&D Start 
Programme in Australia (DITRA 2006), 78 per cent undertook more 
challenging activities than would have occurred in the absence of the 
subsidy.  Similarly, in Germany (Fier et al 2006), funding for R&D projects 
led to 60 per cent of firms undertaking more technically challenging 
projects with similar figures being reported for firms engaging in the Finish 
programmes (Hyvärinen et al, 2006). This suggests that firms undertaking 
publicly subsidised innovation may develop new or improved skill sets 
which add value to subsequent innovation projects (Leiponen, 2005). 
Indeed, Sakibara (1997) found that the development of managers’ skills 
were the most important benefit which firms derived from involvement in 
publicly funded R&D projects. The implication is that public subsidies for 
innovation may lead to congenital learning and improvements in the quality 
or skills of firms’ human resources with potentially positive legacy effects. 
Therefore: 
Proposition 3: Past receipt of public subsidies for innovation will 
increase the innovation returns from current human capital.  
2.3.2 Inter-organisational additionality  
Firms’ innovation outputs depend increasingly, not only on the quality and 
scale of their internal resources but also on their external networks and 
operating environment (Chesborough, 2003, Chesborough, 2006). The 
asymmetric nature of firms’ resources and competencies create the 
potential for learning (Dosi 1997) through inter-organisational collaboration 
and the transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge, also referred to as 
‘vicarious learning’ (Ingram and Baum, 1997). Learning may be manifest in 
various ways, for example, financially where external linkages increase 
firms’ ability to appropriate the returns from innovation, by stimulating 
creativity, reducing risk, accelerating or upgrading the quality of the 
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innovations made, and/or signalling the quality of firms’ innovation activities 
(Powell 1998). External links may also lead to learning as firms search the 
technological environment systematically, permitting access to improved 
technology developed elsewhere (Laursen and Salter, 2006).  
A review of R&D programme evaluations across eleven countries 
concluded that firms in receipt of public support were more likely to 
collaborate with other businesses (OECD 2006). In other words, innovation 
support led to the development of new inter-organisational collaborations 
with the associated potential for knowledge transfer and learning.  This 
suggests that where public subsidies for innovation encourage firms to 
broaden or deepen their external innovation linkages this may generate 
inter-organisational additionality. As with congenital learning, inter-
organisational learning is cumulative and path dependent with the 
acquisition of new knowledge dependent on previously acquired knowledge 
(Powell et al 1996)5. The implication is that public subsidies for innovation 
may increase the effectiveness or depth of firms’ external linkages 
generating positive legacy effects. Therefore: 
Proposition 4: Past receipt of public subsidies for innovation will 
increase the innovation returns from current inter-organisational 
linkages. 
2.3.3 Experiential additionality  
The third mechanism through which firms may experience persistent 
behavioural additionality effects from public subsidies for innovation, is 
through experiential learning. In the innovation literature discussion of 
experiential learning has largely been in terms of dynamic capabilities 
(Zhara and George 2002) whereby firms reconfigure the routines and 
processes used to acquire, assimilate, transform and exploit knowledge in 
response to changing technological and market environments. However, 
the organisational learning literature drew attention much earlier to the 
                                                 
5 However, recent studies have also identified limits to the benefits of openness as the 
number of firms’ external relationships increases (Ahuja and Katila, 2001, Leiponen and 
Helfat, 2010). 
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importance of ‘learning new knowledge and discarding obsolete and 
misleading knowledge (Hedberg 1981, 3), or ‘reducing or eliminating pre-
existing knowledge or habits that would otherwise represent formidable 
barriers to new learning’ (Newstrom 1983, 36).  This ability to reconfigure 
routines and processes is particularly important in volatile technological or 
market conditions with Cegarra-Navarro and Wensley (2009, 534) stating 
that faced with such turbulence, the ‘effective transfer and transformation 
processes for congenital knowledge might be counterproductive if they 
operate uncritically’. 
In the innovation literature, both conceptual and empirical analysis of 
experiential learning is limited (Allen and Holling, 2010, Mugdh and Pilla, 
2011). More commonly, studies have focused on the extent to which firms 
apply for and receive subsequent public innovation subsidies (Clarysse et 
al 2009, Falk 2006, DITRA 2006), however, only partially reflects the the 
essence of experiential learning as ‘embedded within the routines of an 
organization… internal to the firm but external to the human capital nodes’ 
(Bontis, 1998, 66).   Other innovation studies, albeit neglecting the effect of 
public support, have discussed the relationship between innovation and 
perceived environmental uncertainty (Freel, 2005) and innovation 
persistence (Raymond et al., 2010, Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2008). 
Strategic perspectives, for example, suggest that market turbulence may 
create new competitive spaces as rivals close or retrench (Caballero and 
Hammour, 1994), potentially increasing the returns to innovation (Todd, 
2010). Indeed, some firms may actively seek to create market turbulence 
by engaging in disruptive innovation in order to establish a position of 
market or technological leadership (Anthony et al., 2008).  
Despite the lack of conceptual and empirical analysis of experiential 
additionality, evidence demonstrating that firms undertake larger or more 
technologically advanced projects with public subsidies creates the 
potential for experiential learning effects, or experiential additionality.  In 
other words, such innovation projects may lead to changes in existing 
processes and routines and/or the introduction of new ones through 
exploration and reflection. Dependent on firms’ ability to capture this 
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learning (De Holan and Philips 2004), public subsidies for innovation may 
mean that firms are able to reconfigure their resources and innovation 
processes in subsequent periods. That is, the legacy effect of experiential 
learning associated with receipt of innovation subsidies will be greater than 
for those firms without prior public support: 
Proposition 5: Past receipt of public subsidies for innovation will 
increase the innovation returns from current organisational routines 
3. DATA AND METHODS  
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the Irish Innovation Panel 
(IIP) which provides information on the innovation activities of Irish 
manufacturing plants over the period 1991 to 2011. More specifically, the 
IIP comprises seven surveys or waves conducted using similar survey 
methodologies and questionnaires with common questions (Roper et al, 
1996, Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 1998, Roper and Anderson, 2000, Hewitt-
Dundas and Roper, 2008). Each survey covers the innovation activities of 
manufacturing business units with 10 or more employees over a three-year 
reference period. The resulting panel is highly unbalanced reflecting non-
response in individual surveys but also the opening and closure of 
business units over the 21 year period covered. The panel contains 5,594 
observations on 3,254 individual business units representing an overall 
response rate of 32.1 per cent. Variable definitions are included in Annex 1 
and correlations in Annex 2.  
For the current analysis we focus on two innovation variables. First, a 
‘narrow’ definition of innovative sales calculated as the proportion of plants’ 
total sales (during the final year of each three-year reference period) 
derived from products newly introduced during the previous three years. 
Secondly, a ‘broad’ measure of innovative sales defined as the proportion 
of plants’ sales accounted for by newly introduced and improved products. 
Both of these variables reflect not only plants’ ability to introduce 
new/improved products to the market but also their short-term commercial 
success. For the estimation sample used in this paper (see below) 12.3 per 
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cent of plants’ sales were derived from newly introduced products, while 
21.4 per cent were derived from new and improved products (Table 1)6.  
Standardly, we model the determinants of these two innovation sales 
measures using an innovation production function, which relates innovation 
outputs to the inputs to the innovation process (Griliches, 1995, Love and 
Roper, 2001, Laursen and Salter, 2006).  For example, if Ii is an innovative 
sales indicator for firm i, the innovation production function can be written 
as: 
iiiiiiiiti PSRIENXSSKRDII    765432110  
 (1) 
Where: RDi are plants’ investments in R&D, SKi are skills inputs into 
innovation, XSi represents external knowledge search or openness, ENi is 
a set of indicators of plants’ business environment, and RIi is a set of other 
plant level control variables.  
Also, in equation (1), let PSi be a binary indicator of whether a plant 
received public subsidies for innovation. In both Ireland and Northern 
Ireland innovation subsidies have been an important element of industrial 
development policy over the last two decades. In Ireland, measures to 
support innovation in externally-owned firms have been operated primarily 
through the Irish Development Agency (or IDA), with support for locally-
owned firms operated by Enterprise Ireland (Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 
2008). Typically these measures have involved grant support which has 
subsidised a proportion of the cost of an innovation project. In Northern 
Ireland, public support for innovation has been operated primarily through 
Invest Northern Ireland and, before 2001, the Industrial Research and 
Technology Unit (IRTU) (Cooke et. al. 2003, Roper, 2009).  
  
                                                 
6 Correlations between the two innovation output variables are strong, however, 
(correlation coefficient is 0.805) suggesting firms which perform well on the narrow 
innovation measure also tend to perform well on the broader indicator of new and 
improved products.  
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Again, innovation support measures have been predominantly grants, 
providing subsidies to particular innovation activities7. In the IIP surveys, 
plants are asked to indicate whether they have received government 
subsidies for various activities over the last three years including training, 
marketing activity etc. Here, we are primarily concerned with two questions 
which ask plants to indicate first, whether they ‘have received government 
support for product development over the last three years’, and, second 
whether they have received ‘government support for R&D not linked to any 
specific product development’. Overall, 21.4 per cent of plants reported 
receiving support for new product development (NPD), an average of 21.7 
per cent in Northern Ireland and 21.3 per cent in Ireland (Table 1)8. A 
smaller proportion of firms – 11.8 per cent – reported receiving support for 
R&D.  
Here, we are interested in the legacy effects of public subsidies from earlier 
periods9. For plants which received innovation subsidies in previous 
periods, these legacy effects may increase the innovation benefits derived 
from innovation inputs in the current period relative to those plants which 
had no prior subsidy. For example, congenital additionality – learning 
effects - may enhance the innovation capabilities of graduate employees, 
while legacy input additionality effects may enhance the contribution to 
innovation of current R&D investments.  
  
                                                 
7 In other papers we have documented in detail the development of innovation and R&D 
policy in Ireland and Northern Ireland. See in particular: Hewitt-Dundas and Roper (2009), 
O'Malley et al. (2008), (Roper, 1998), Hewitt-Dundas et al. (2005). 
8 The correlation between receiving public support for NPD in the current period and 
previous period was 0.336 (Northern Ireland, 0.316, Ireland, 0.349) in Ireland. Essentially 
similar results have been noted elsewhere. Dugeuet (2004) noted that in France among 
firms receiving R&D subsidies in 1996, 76 per cent were also subsidised in 1997. Similar 
results are evident in Germany for the Direct R&D Project Funding Scheme (Aschhoff, 
2010). 
9 There is substantial evidence of this type of short-term additionality effect from 
innovation policy (Aerts and Schmidt, 2008, Aschhoff and Fier, 2005, Buiseret et al., 
1995, Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006, Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2009, Hsu et al., 2009). 
Strong and significant short-term additionality effects are also evident in our data 
controlling for sample selection and using a range of estimation approaches 
(instrumental variables, matching estimators). Results are available on request from 
the authors. 
 
 
 
 
The legacy of public subsidies for innovation 
 
 20 
To test the hypotheses, we define PSit-1 as an indicator variable which 
takes value 1 if the firm received public support for innovation in the 
previous wave of the IIP and 0 otherwise10. Then, to evaluate Hypothesis 2, 
the potential for legacy output additionality effects, we use PSit-1 to partition 
the regressor Iit-1 between those firms which did and did not receive 
innovation subsidies in the previous period and then compare the two 
estimated coefficients. This amounts to estimating: 
iiiii
iiitit
B
itit
A
i
PSRIENXS
SKRDPSIPSII



 
7654
321111110 )1(
(2)
 
and then testing whether 𝛽1
𝐴 > 𝛽1
𝐵. If this inequality holds it suggests legacy 
output additionality effects. Essentially similar tests then apply to the other 
hypotheses. 
Operationalizing equation (2) for the other hypotheses draws on a range of 
other data from the IIP. To reflect the potential for legacy input additionality 
effects we consider its effects on the innovation benefits of plants’ in-house 
R&D, a factor which has been linked positively to innovation success by 
previous studies (Love and Roper, 2001, Love and Roper, 2005, Griffith et 
al., 2003). In the IIP an average of 46.1 per cent of plants were undertaking 
in-house R&D, a proportion which varied relatively little over the survey 
period (Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2008). The potential for legacy 
congenital additionality effects is measured by their effects on the 
innovation benefits of two human capital variables: the proportion of plants’ 
workforces with a degree and whether plants reported that a lack of 
technical skills was a barrier to innovation. Both variables have previously 
been linked to innovation success in studies using an innovation production 
function approach (Leiponen, 2005, Freel, 2005, Hewitt-Dundas, 2006). On 
average across the IIP, 9.7 per cent of plants’ workforces had a degree 
                                                 
10 In other words, where plants received public support for NPD or R&D in the 
previous wave of the survey 4-6 years previously. 
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level qualification, while 37.2 per cent of plants reported that technical skills 
were a ‘significant’ or ‘very significant’ barrier to innovation (Table 1)11. 
Legacy inter-organisational additionality effects reflect the extent to which 
plants’ innovation networks may be enhanced or developed as a result of 
prior innovation subsidies (OECD, 2006). Here, legacy effects require that 
the innovation benefit of a given level of network activity – reflected in the 
estimated coefficients in the innovation production function - is greater 
where a plant received previous public subsidies for innovation. We include 
two measures: whether a lack of technical information was a significant 
barrier to plants innovation activity, and the ‘breadth’ of plants’ innovation 
network activities or ‘openness’ measured as per Laursen and Salter 
(2006). This is an index which takes values between one and eight 
depending on the number of different types of innovation partners with 
which a plant is engaging. In the models we also include a square of this 
variable to reflect the standard finding of an inverted-U shaped relationship 
between innovation outputs and network breadth (Leiponen and Helfat, 
2011)12. Finally, to capture the potential for legacy experiential additionality 
effects we consider two measures which reflect environmental barriers to 
business innovation: regulatory or legislative factors and a lack of finance 
for innovation. In both cases we would anticipate that the provision of 
public subsidies in one period might lead to organisational learning effects 
which moderate the effect of these innovation barriers in subsequent 
periods.  
In the estimated models we also include two other control variables which 
give an indication of the scale of plants’ resources – size – as well as the 
potential for the cumulative accumulation of knowledge capital by older 
plants (Klette and Johansen, 1998) and plant life-cycle effects (Atkeson 
                                                 
11 In the IIP plants were asked to indicate the importance of various barriers to innovation 
on a 1 to 5 Likert scale. In the operationalization of equations (1) and (2) these variables 
were transformed into binary indicators taking value one if an innovation barrier was said 
to be ‘significant’ or ‘very significant’ and zero otherwise.  
12 Interestingly, the potential for organisational learning in plants’ innovation networking 
activity has recently been examined by Love et al. (2013). Their analysis, using the same 
data set as that used here, suggests positive evidence of learning effects and perhaps the 
potential for inter-organisational legacy effects. 
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and Kehoe, 2005). Sector dummies at the 2-digit level and wave dummies 
are also included in each model (but not reported). Our estimation 
approach is determined primarily by the nature of our innovation output 
variables – the percentage of innovative sales. Panel data tobit models are 
therefore used to estimate models of equations (1) and (2)13.  
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Baseline models of the innovation production function (Equation 1) are 
reported in Table 2 for the narrow and broad measures of innovative sales. 
Results are largely consistent between the two innovation measures, and 
RHS variables largely take the expected sign. Innovation outputs are 
positively related to R&D suggesting significant input effects (Love and 
Roper, 2001, Love and Roper, 2005, Griffith et al., 2003). Last period’s 
level of innovation sales is also significant in both models suggesting a 
significant degree of autocorrelation in innovative sales. Levels of graduate 
employment are also positive but insignificantly related to both innovation 
indicators, while a lack of technical skills has a weak negative effect on 
innovative sales (Table 2). Both suggest a positive – if weak – link between 
firms’ human capital resources and innovation (Leiponen, 2005, Freel, 
2005, Hewitt-Dundas, 2006). Openness indicators have the expected 
inverted-U shape relationship to both the narrow and broad measure of 
innovative sales (Laursen and Salter, 2006, Leiponen and Helfat, 2011). 
Business environment effects are weaker, with neither legislative 
restrictions nor a lack of finance for innovation having significant effects. 
The two control variables have the expected signs: larger firms are 
generally more innovative, while older plants have lower levels of 
innovative sales (Table 2).   
Models designed to test each of the hypotheses are reported in Table 3 for 
the narrow measure of innovative sales, and Table 4 for the broad 
measure. Models reported relate to the legacy effects of public subsidies 
                                                 
13 Note here that we are not interested in the treatment term on current innovation subsidies 
(β7) which reflects short-term additionality. Instead this acts as control variable in our tests 
for legacy effects from prior public support. 
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for new product development (NPD) activity. Our first hypothesis relates to 
the potential for legacy input additionality effects and, in particular, whether 
the innovation benefits of plants’ R&D investments are enhanced by prior 
subsidies for NPD. Partitioning R&D investment as suggested in equation 
(2) suggests that R&D inputs play an important role in innovation 
regardless of whether a plant had previously received public subsidies for 
NPD or not (Model 1, Tables 3 and 4). The coefficients also suggest that 
the innovation benefits of R&D are marginally greater for both the narrow 
and broad innovation sales measures where a plant had previously 
received NPD subsidies (Model 1, Tables 3 and 4). Wald tests of the 
restriction  𝛽1
𝐴 = 𝛽1
𝐵, however, suggest these differences are insignificant 
(Table 5). Our results therefore provide no evidence of legacy input 
additionality effects from NPD subsidies for either innovation measure and 
therefore no support for Hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 2 relates to potential legacy output additionality effects.  For 
both the narrow and broad measures we find that lagged innovative sales 
effects prove important regardless of whether a plant had previously 
received NPD subsidies (Model 2, Tables 3 and 4). The Wald tests suggest 
significant differences between the estimated coefficients on the partitioned 
lagged innovative sales measure but only for the narrow measure of 
innovative sales (Table 5). One possible explanation is that public 
subsidies are enhancing the quality or novelty of firms’ innovative output in 
the previous period, which then provides an enhanced basis for 
subsequent innovation. Such innovation quality effects from public support 
for NPD have been recognised in a number of other studies (Bérubé and 
Mohnen, 2009, Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2009). However, our evidence 
here suggests that the effects of these innovation quality improvements 
persist, giving previously subsidised plants longer-term strategic 
advantages perhaps by helping them to achieve positions of technology or 
market leadership or first-mover advantage. Alternatively, public support for 
NPD may be allowing firms to invest in platform technologies which may 
allow the development of variants in future periods (Pasche and 
Magnusson, 2011). Or, by enhancing the market reputation of an 
enterprise with consumers, firms’ innovation may be more successful in the 
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market place (Henard and Dacin, 2010). Whatever the explanation, our 
results provide some support for Hypothesis 2 and legacy output 
additionality effects from NPD subsidies.  
Hypothesis 3 relates to congenital additionality and the potential legacy 
effects of public NPD subsidies on the innovation benefits of plants’ human 
capital. As in the baseline models (Table 1) we find little evidence that 
levels of graduate employment have any significant effect on innovation 
outputs regardless of whether plants had, or had not, previously received 
NPD subsidies (Model 3, Tables 3 and 4). There is clear evidence, 
however, that prior public support for NPD is significant in offsetting the 
effect of a lack of technical skills on both measures of innovative sales 
(Model 3, Tables 3 and 4).  Two possibilities are evident here. First, it may 
be that the experience of working on publicly supported innovation projects 
has given plants’ senior management a better understanding of the quality 
of their skill base for innovation. This may be reducing management 
perceptions of any lack of technical skills. A more likely scenario, however, 
is that plants’ prior experience of publicly funded innovation projects has 
resulted in the type of learning-by-doing effects noted by Sakakibara 
(1997). In statistical terms, a joint test of the equality of the coefficients on 
the two human capital measures is rejected for both the narrow and broad 
measures of innovative sales (Table 5). This provides strong support for 
Hypothesis 3 and legacy congenital additionality effects from NPD 
subsidies.  
The potential for legacy inter-organisational additionality effects is captured 
in our innovation production functions by two variables: the breadth of 
plants’ co-operative relationships for innovation and a perceived lack of 
technical information. In our baseline models (Table 2) plants’ co-operative 
relationships play a significant role, with evidence of an inverted-U shape 
relationship with innovation (Laursen and Salter, 2006, Leiponen and 
Helfat, 2010). We also find a negative, albeit insignificant, innovation effect 
associated with a perceived lack of technical information (Table 2). The 
innovation effects of both variables differ markedly, however, depending on 
whether or not plants had previously received subsidies for NPD (Model 4, 
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Tables 3 and 4): co-operative relationships for innovation only prove 
beneficial for innovation when a plant received prior innovation subsidies; 
and, prior subsidies also offset the negative effect of a lack of technical 
information. The implication is that inter-organisational relationships have 
stronger innovation benefits where firms have received NPD subsidies, a 
suggestion confirmed by the relevant Wald test (Table 5). One possible 
explanation is that publicly subsidised NPD projects encourage firms to 
develop new innovation partnerships (OECD, 2006), and that as these 
relationships mature they provide increasing innovation benefits (Baum et. 
al. 2012). Alternatively, public subsidies for NPD may have a signalling 
effect, making it easier for plants to develop future innovation partnerships 
and/or access external information sources (Kleer, 2010). Either 
mechanism could generate the legacy inter-organisational additionality 
effects we observe.   
Our final Hypothesis (5) relates to experiential additionality, the idea that 
organisational learning during a publicly subsidised NPD project may allow 
a plant to develop improved routines or processes. Better routines may 
then help to minimise the innovation impacts of either financial constraints 
or regulatory restrictions. Results here are rather mixed with neither aspect 
of the business environment having a significant effect on innovation 
outcomes in the baseline models (Table 2). Legacy experiential 
additionality effects are also only evident in terms of regulatory barriers with 
no significant finance effect for either the narrow or broad measure of 
innovative sales (Model 5, Tables 3 and 4). A joint test of the equality of the 
coefficients on the two experiential additionality measures is rejected only 
in the case of the narrow measure of innovative sales providing only partial 
support for any legacy experiential additionality effects from NPD subsidies 
(Table 5). 
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So far we have considered the legacy effects of public subsidies for NPD. 
Repeating the analysis for prior receipt of public subsidies targeted at more 
basic R&D (not linked to any specific product/service) suggests strikingly 
different results, however.14 For NPD subsidies the most consistent legacy 
effects are congenital and inter-organisational, both of which reflect 
improvements in the innovation capabilities of subsidised plants. For R&D 
subsidies, however, neither of these behavioural additionality effects are 
significant (Table 5). Here, instead, here the most consistent legacy effect 
operates through prior innovation or output additionality. One possibility is 
that this contrast reflects the nature of the innovation activity being 
supported by each type of subsidy: R&D subsidies are likely to support 
more basic research activity, with projects being undertaken predominantly 
by either scientific or technical staff; Subsidised NPD projects on the other 
hand are likely to involve a wider range of skill groups with the potential for 
a broader legacy of capability development.  
5. CONCLUSIONS  
Two main empirical conclusions follow from our study. First, our study 
suggests the significance of the legacy effects of innovation subsidies, 
reinforcing other international evidence of the positive short-term 
additionality of such public support for innovation (Aerts and Schmidt, 
2008, Aschhoff and Fier, 2005, Buiseret et al., 1995, Czarnitzki and Licht, 
2006, Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2009, Hsu et al., 2009). The implication is 
that any assessment of the benefits of innovation support based solely on 
its short-term impacts is likely to under-estimate the total benefits of such 
support to recipient firms. This supports other suggestions (Martin and 
Scott, 2000, Woolthuis et al., 2005) that undertaking innovation policy 
evaluation with a short-term perspective on its benefits may result in policy 
failure which lead to an under-investment in public innovation support, 
exacerbating market or system failures. This effect is likely to be more 
serious where short-term evaluations also under-estimate the wider social 
                                                 
14 Full details of the analysis for R&D subsidies – the equivalents of Tables 3 and 4 – are 
available from the authors on request. 
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benefits of innovation support, benefits which are also only likely to be 
observable in the longer-term (Beugelsdijck and Cornet, 2001).   
Second, our study identifies clear contrasts between the types of legacy 
effect which arise from different types of innovation subsidies: NPD 
subsidies lead to a legacy of broadly based capability development, while 
R&D subsidies result only in legacy effects mediated through prior 
innovation. The suggestion is that the legacy effects of each type of 
subsidy operate through very different mechanisms. Legacy effects from 
NPD subsidies appear largely behavioural, with subsidies generating 
longer-term benefits through increases in the innovation benefits of plants’ 
human capital and network relationships. For R&D subsidies the key 
legacy effect operates through a process of product quality improvement 
rather than through a legacy of improved innovation capabilities. R&D 
support in particular might be expected to contribute in the longer-term to 
the quality of firms’ product portfolio through a quality ladder effect and 
hence to the longer term success of firms’ innovation (Grupp and Stadler, 
2005) and exporting (Chen, 2012). 
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that the legacy effects of 
innovation subsidies extend beyond the generally anticipated behavioural 
effects and include legacy output additionality effects. The potential for 
such legacy effects suggests that implementing measures to help firms 
capture the potential longer-term benefits of publicly supported innovation 
projects may be helpful. In terms of business finance, for example, there 
has recently been considerable discussion of intelligent finance or 
intelligent capital and the notion that venture capital firms often provide 
both finance and managerial expertise to their client companies. In terms of 
NPD or R&D support the analogue – intelligent innovation policy – might 
provide technology or innovation management support to firms alongside 
any subsidy support to help firms capture and embed potential strategic 
lessons (Technology Strategy Board 2013).  
Our study suffers from a number of limitations. First, it is restricted to a 
single geographic area and covers only manufacturing firms. This may be 
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imparting a bias to the results and it would be useful therefore to examine 
the profile of legacy effects from innovation subsidies for different groups of 
firms. Second, while the literature around behavioural additionality has 
developed rapidly over recent years there has been less discussion of the 
different dimensions of output additionality. How does this work? Is this a 
product quality or novelty effect? Or, does this effect relate to firms’ 
development of new platform technologies? Further research examining 
these alternative types of output additionality would be valuable in 
understanding the full range of legacy effects from innovation support. 
Third, because of the structure of the IIP which focuses on three year 
reference periods, our analysis is restricted to the legacy effects of 
innovation subsidies which occur in the period 4 to 6 years after the initial 
support was provided. Long product development cycles in some 
industries, however, may make even this timescale too short and even 
longer-term follow-ups of innovation support may help to clarify the full 
range of benefits from such interventions. Finally, it is worth noting that our 
analysis also focuses specifically on the legacy benefits for the subsidised 
organisation itself. However, there may well be wider economic or social 
benefits from public R&D subsidies which would also need to be taken into 
account in order to capture the full range of benefits from such support 
(Roper et al, 2004). Accounting for these benefits may help to provide a 
more comprehensive view of the social and economic returns to innovation 
subsidies.  
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Figure 1: Research model  
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Table 1: Sample Descriptives for estimation sample  
    
| 
No. of 
observations Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Innovation Measures     
Sales of new products (percentage of sales) 1678 12.293 19.766 
Sales of new and improved products (percentage of 
sales) 
1674 21.355 28.299 
    
Public support indicators     
Public support for NPD 1765 0.214 0.410 
Public support for R&D 1769 0.118 0.322 
    
Legacy measures     
In-house R&D (yes/no) 1776 0.461 0.498 
Workforce with degree (percentage of workforce) 1696 9.695 12.719 
Innovation barrier: Technical skills (yes/no) 1798 0.372 0.483 
Breadth of external search (number of partner types) 1764 1.190 1.879 
Innovation barrier: Lack technical information (yes/no) 1764 4.946 11.124 
Innovation barrier: Regulatory or legislative factors 
(yes/no) 
1798 0.351 0.477 
Innovation barrier: Lack finance for innovation 
(yes/no) 
1798 0.383 0.486 
    
Control variables     
Plant employment  1767 77.760 236.752 
Plant vintage (years) 1794 32.566 30.037 
 
Source: Irish Innovation Panel, waves 2-7 of the survey are included. 
Observations are weighted to give representative results. Observations are 
included only where a lagged observation is available to allow estimation of 
legacy effects. 
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Table 2: Tobit models of percentage of innovative sales: baseline models 
 
 New product sales  
New and improved 
product sales 
 
  
 
  Public support for NPD 4.878** 6.466** 
 
(1.928) (2.667) 
New product sales (-1) 0.339*** 
 
 
(0.041) 
 New and improved  sales (-1)  0.317*** 
  (0.043) 
In-house R&D 14.731*** 24.891*** 
 (1.776) (2.462) 
Workforce with degree 0.061 0.057 
 (0.064) (0.089) 
Innovation barrier: Technical skills -3.751* -4.679* 
 
(2.024) (2.819) 
Breadth of search 3.025*** 6.439*** 
 
(1.087) (1.515) 
Breadth of search squared -0.16 -0.528** 
 
(0.179) (0.249) 
Innovation barrier: Lack tech. info. -1.835 -4.812 
 
(2.219) (3.086) 
Innovation barrier: Regulatory factors -1.662 0.086 
 
(1.985) (2.745) 
Innovation barrier: Lack finance 1.578 1.621 
 
(1.743) (2.409) 
Employment (log) 0.73 2.382** 
 
(0.839) (1.154) 
Plant vintage -0.071*** -0.146*** 
 
(0.027) (0.037) 
   
Number  of observations 1519 1513 
Equation χ2 439.834 572.246 
BIC 8622.955 9374.657 
Source: Irish Innovation Panel, waves 2-7 of the survey are included. 
Observations are weighted to give representative results. Observations are 
included only where a lagged observation is available to allow estimation of 
legacy effects. Coefficients reported are marginal effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. All models include a set of (10) sectoral and wave dummies (not reported).   
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Table 3: Estimating additionality effects on new product sales from NPD support 
 
 
New 
product 
sales 
New 
product 
sales 
New 
product 
sales  
New 
product 
sales  
New 
product 
sales  
 (2) (1) (3) (4) (5) 
In-house R&D  15.029*** 13.567*** 14.619*** 14.814*** 
 
 
(1.766) (1.839) (1.759) (1.767) 
New product sales (-1) 0.306***  0.293*** 0.296*** 0.296*** 
 (0.041)  (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) 
Innovation barrier: Technical skills -3.429* -3.565* 
 
-3.475* -3.632* 
 (2.006) (2.001) 
 
(1.995) (2.001) 
Workforce with degree 0.054 0.069 
 
0.072 0.071 
 (0.064) (0.063) 
 
(0.063) (0.063) 
Breadth of search 3.040*** 3.072*** 2.757** 
 
2.920*** 
 (1.080) (1.075) (1.078) 
 
(1.077) 
Breadth of search squared -0.184 -0.175 -0.154 
 
-0.155 
 (0.178) (0.177) (0.177) 
 
(0.177) 
Innovation barrier: Lack tech. info. -1.522 -1.565 -1.141 
 
-1.199 
 (2.198) (2.193) (2.191) 
 
(2.197) 
Innovation barrier: Regulatory factors -2.364 -2.564 -2.285 -2.094 
 
 (1.972) (1.972) (1.963) (1.967) 
 Innovation barrier: Lack finance 1.958 1.796 2.05 1.853 
 
 (1.733) (1.729) (1.729) (1.722) 
 Employment (log) 0.45 0.814 0.484 0.776 0.796 
 (0.850) (0.833) (0.848) (0.830) (0.835) 
Plant vintage -0.065** -0.071*** -0.065** -0.070*** -0.073*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Public support for NPD 3.443* 4.393** 3.06 3.557* 4.112** 
 (1.996) (1.923) (1.965) (1.933) (1.927) 
In-house R&D  x PS(-1) 15.620***     
 (2.847)     
In-house R&D x (1-PS(-1)) 13.605***     
 (1.887)     
New product sales (-1) x PS(-1)  0.393***    
  (0.063)    
New product sales (-1)x (1-PS(-1))  0.282***    
  (0.044)    
Inn. barrier: Technical skills x PS(-1)   6.106*   
   (3.403)   
Inn. barrier: Technical skills x (1-PS(-1))   -5.972***   
   (2.140)   
Workforce with degree x PS(-1)   -0.007 
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   (0.112) 
  Workforce with degree x (1-PS(-1))   0.071 
     (0.068) 
  Breadth of search  x PS(-1)    4.605**  
    (1.986)  
Breadth of search x (1-PS(-1))    2.282*  
    (1.193)  
Breadth of search sqr, x PS(-1)    -0.523  
    (0.328)  
Breadth of search sqr, x (1-PS(-1))    -0.021  
    (0.203)  
Inn. barrier: Lack tech. info x PS(-1)    9.270**  
    (3.769)  
Inn. barrier: Lack tech. info x (1-PS(-1))    -4.258*  
    (2.341)  
Inn. barrier: Regulatory factors x PS(-1)     3.401 
     (3.724) 
Inn. barrier: Reg. factors x (1-PS(-1))     -3.942* 
     (2.153) 
Inn. barrier: Lack finance x PS(-1)     3.989 
     (3.282) 
Inn. barrier: Lack finance x (1-PS(-1))     1.448 
     (1.874) 
      
Number  of observations 1504 1514 1504 1514 1514 
Equation χ2 444.61 444.203 453.511 458.205 444.664 
BIC 8534.391 8598.875 8530.567 8599.58 8601.906 
Source: Irish Innovation Panel, waves 2-7 of the survey are included. 
Observations are weighted to give representative results. Observations are 
included in the tobit models only where a lagged observation is available to 
allow estimation of legacy effects. Coefficients reported are marginal 
effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models include a set of (10) sectoral and 
wave dummies (not reported).   
 
 
 
  
 
The legacy of public subsidies for innovation 
 
 34 
Table 4: Estimating additionality effects on new and improved sales from 
NPD support 
 
 
New and 
improved 
product 
sales 
New and 
improved 
product 
sales 
New and 
improved 
product 
sales 
New and 
improved 
product 
sales 
New and 
improved 
product 
sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
In-house R&D  25.387*** 25.158*** 24.759*** 24.935*** 
  (2.465) (2.456) (2.446) (2.458) 
New and improved sales (-1) 0.293*** 
 
0.288*** 0.289*** 0.287*** 
 (0.044) 
 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
Innovation barrier: Technical skills -4.472 -4.467 
 
-4.142 -4.703* 
 (2.805) (2.811) 
 
(2.792) (2.801) 
Workforce with degree 0.061 0.06 
 
0.06 0.058 
 (0.089) (0.089) 
 
(0.088) (0.088) 
Breadth of search 6.340*** 6.432*** 6.045*** 
 
6.207*** 
 (1.508) (1.509) (1.508) 
 
(1.507) 
Breadth of search squared -0.521** -0.531** -0.486** 
 
-0.501** 
 (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) 
 
(0.248) 
Innovation barrier: Lack tech. info. -4.59 -4.55 -3.908 
 
-3.856 
 (3.068) (3.071) (3.068) 
 
(3.071) 
Innovation barrier: Regulatory factors -0.656 -0.628 -0.64 -0.044 
 
 (2.741) (2.743) (2.734) (2.728) 
 Innovation barrier: Lack finance 1.74 1.644 1.743 1.74 
 
 (2.400) (2.401) (2.393) (2.383) 
 Employment (log) 2.387** 2.406** 2.475** 2.376** 2.370** 
 (1.151) (1.150) (1.148) (1.140) (1.148) 
Plant vintage -0.146*** -0.144*** -0.145*** -0.144*** -0.149*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Public support for NPD 5.264* 6.035** 5.333** 4.815* 5.196* 
 (2.739) (2.693) (2.685) (2.687) (2.681) 
In-house R&D  x PS(-1) 29.990***     
 (3.788)     
In-house R&D x (1-PS(-1)) 24.420***     
 (2.546)     
New product sales (-1) x PS(-1)  0.330***    
  (0.063)    
New product sales (-1)x (1-PS(-1))  0.290***    
  (0.047)    
Inn. barrier: Technical skills x PS(-1)  
 
7.933* 
  
  
 
(4.750) 
  Inn. barrier: Technical skills x (1-PS(-1))  
 
-7.802*** 
  
  
 
(3.002) 
  
 
The legacy of public subsidies for innovation 
 
 35 
Workforce with degree x PS(-1)   -0.006   
   (0.154)   
Workforce with degree x (1-PS(-1))   0.084   
   (0.096)   
Breadth of search  x PS(-1)    5.938**  
    (2.781)  
Breadth of search x (1-PS(-1))    5.998***  
    (1.671)  
Breadth of search sqr, x PS(-1)    -0.657  
    (0.456)  
Breadth of search sqr, x (1-PS(-1))    -0.412  
    (0.286)  
Inn. barrier: Lack tech. info x PS(-1)  
  
12.968** 
 
  
  
(5.291) 
 Inn. barrier: Lack tech. info x (1-PS(-1))  
  
-8.952*** 
 
  
  
(3.266) 
 Inn. barrier: Regulatory factors x PS(-1)  
   
9.823* 
  
   
(5.180) 
Inn. barrier: Reg. factors x (1-PS(-1))  
   
-3.289 
  
   
(2.986) 
Inn. barrier: Lack finance x PS(-1)  
   
2.94 
  
   
(4.599) 
Inn. barrier: Lack finance x (1-PS(-1))  
   
1.482 
  
   
(2.594) 
Number  of observations 1509 1509 1509 1509 1509 
Equation χ2 575.871 574.184 582.626 595.046 581.507 
BIC 9350.138 9352.222 9349.667 9349.657 9351.125 
Source: Irish Innovation Panel, waves 2-7 of the survey are included. 
Observations are weighted to give representative results. Observations are 
included in tobits only where a lagged observation is available to allow 
estimation of legacy effects. Coefficients reported are marginal effects. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models include a set of (10) sectoral and wave dummies 
(not reported).   
 
  
 
The legacy of public subsidies for innovation 
 
 36 
 
Table 5: Summary of Wald tests for Additionality: By public support 
for NPD and R&D last period 
 
 
 Public support for NPD Public support for R&D 
 New 
product 
sales 
New and 
improved 
product 
sales 
New 
product 
sales 
New and 
improved 
product 
sales 
Input additionality 0.62 2.48 0.72 3.75* 
Output additionality 3.08* 0.40 6.87*** 4.97** 
Behavioural addit.: 
Congenital  
11.82*** 10.30*** 2.22 2.69 
Behavioural addit.: 
Inter-organ. 
17.00*** 17.71*** 3.28 6.10 
Behavioural addit.: 
Experiential 
7.30** 8.83 1.41 3.42 
Sources: NPD, models in Tables 2 and 3. R&D models not reported. 
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Annex 1: Data Definitions 
 
Innovative sales (new)  
(% sales) 
An indicator representing the percentage of firms’ sales at 
the time of the survey accounted for by products which had 
been newly introduced over the previous three years.  
 
Innovative sales (new 
and improved)  (% 
sales) 
An indicator representing the percentage of firms’ sales at 
the time of the survey accounted for by products which had 
been newly introduced or improved over the previous three 
years.  
 
Public support for NPD  A binary indicator taking value one if the firm had received 
government support for NPD over the previous three years. 
 
Public support for R&D A binary indicator taking value one if the firm had received 
government support for R&D over the previous three years. 
 
In plant R&D A binary indictor taking value one if the firm has an in-house 
R&D capacity.  
 
Innovation Partnering An indicator of the number of the breadth of innovation 
partnering conducted by the firm. Takes values 0 to 10 
depending on how many different types of partner firm is 
working with: group company, supplier, consultant, client, 
competitor, joint venture, government laboratory, university, 
private laboratory, industry research centre.  
 
Percentage with degree Percentage of the workforce with a degree or equivalent 
qualification.  
 
Innovation barrier: 
technical skills 
A dummy variable indicating whether a firm said technical 
skills were either a ‘major’ or ‘very major’ barrier to 
innovation.  
 
Innovation barrier: 
technical information  
A dummy variable indicating whether a firm said a lack of 
technical information was either a ‘major’ or ‘very major’ 
barrier to innovation.  
 
Innovation barrier: 
regulation or legislation 
A dummy variable indicating whether a firm said regulation 
or legislation was either a ‘major’ or ‘very major’ barrier to 
innovation.  
 
Innovation barrier: 
finance for innovation  
A dummy variable indicating whether a firm said a lack of 
finance was either a ‘major’ or ‘very major’ barrier to 
innovation.  
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External search  
An indicator of the number of external partner types the firm 
was working with as part of its innovation activity (takes 
values 0 to 8). 
 
Exporting firm  A binary indicator taking value one if the firm was selling 
outside the UK and Ireland. 
 
R&D Department A binary indictor taking value one if the firm had a formally 
organised internal R&D department. 
 
Plant vintage  The age of the site (in years) at the time of the survey. 
 
Externally owned A binary indicator taking value one if the firm was owned 
outside Ireland at the time of the survey.  
 
Employment Employment at the time of the survey.  
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Fier, A., Aschhoff, B. & Löhlein, H. 2006. Behavioural additionality of public 
R&D funding in Germany. In: OECD, ed. Government R&D funding and 
company behaviour: measuring behavioural additionality. Paris: OECD. 
Freel, M. S. 2005. Patterns of Innovation and skills in small firms. 
Technovation. 25(2), 123-134. 
García-Quevedo, J. 2004. Do public subsidies complement business R&D? 
A meta-analysis of the econometric evidence. Kyklos. 57, 87-102. 
Georghiou, L. 2002. Impact and Additionality of Innovation Policy. In: 
Boekholt, P., ed. Innovation policy and sustainable development: can 
innovation incentives make a difference? Brussels: IWT Observatory. 
Georghiou, L. 2004. Evaluation of behavioural additionality: Concept 
Paper. IWT-Studies, [Online].  48, 7-22. [Accessed 13 September  2013.] 
Available from: http://tinyurl.com/naqmr6x 
Griffith, R., Redding, S. & Van Reenan, J. 2003. R&D and Absorptive 
Capacity: Theory and Empirical Evidence. Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics. 105, 99-118. 
Griliches, Z. 1995. R&D and Productivity: Econometric Results and 
Measurement Issues. Oxford: Blackwell. 
  
 
The legacy of public subsidies for innovation 
 
 45 
Grossman, G. & Helpman, E. 1991. Quality ladders and product cycles. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 106, 557-
586. 
Grupp, H. & Stadler, M. 2005. Technological progress and market growth: 
An empirical study based on the quality-ladder approach. Technological 
Forecasting And Social Change. 72, 413-428. 
Hedberg, B. 1981. How organizations learn and unlearn. In: Nystrom, P. & 
Starbuck, W.H. eds. Handbook of Organizational Design. London: 
Cambridge University Press. Vol. 1. 
Henard, D. H. & Dacin, P. A. 2010. Reputation for product innovation: its 
impact on consumers*. Journal of Product Innovation Management. 27, 
321-335. 
Hewitt-Dundas, N. 2006. Resource and capability constraints to innovation 
in small and large plants. Small Business Economics. 26, 257-277. 
Hewitt-Dundas, N., Andreosso-O'Callaghan, B. & Lenihan, H. 2005. 
Innovation policy in Ireland and Northern Ireland, 1991 to 2001 - The 
Changing face of enterprise-level financial incentives for R&D. 45th 
Congress of the European Regional Science Association. Vrije Universiteit, 
Amsterdam, 23rd-27th August. 
Hewitt-Dundas, N. & Roper, S. 2008. Ireland’s innovation performance: 
1991-2005. Quarterly Economic Commentary. Dubli: ESRI. 46-68.  
Hewitt-Dundas, N. & Roper, S. 2009. Output additionality of public support 
for innovation: evidence for Irish manufacturing plants. European Planning 
Studies. 18, 107-122. 
Hewitt-Dundas, N. & Roper, S. 2011. Creating advantage in peripheral 
regions: the role of publicly funded R&D centres. Research Policy. 40, 832-
841. 
 
The legacy of public subsidies for innovation 
 
 46 
Hsu, F.-M., Horng, D.-J. & Hsueh, C.-C. 2009. The effect of government-
sponsored R&D programmes on additionality in recipient firms in Taiwan. 
Technovation. 29, 204-217. 
Hyvärinen, J. 2006. Behavioural additionality of public R&D funding in 
Finland. In: OECD, ed. Government R&D funding and company behaviour: 
measuring behavioural additionality. Paris: OECD. 
Ingram, P., & Baum, J.A.C. 1997. Opportunity and constraint: 
Organizations’ learning from the operating and competitive experience of 
industries. Strategic Management Journal. 18, 75-98. 
Jimenez-Jimenez, D. & Sanz-Valle, R. 2011. Innovation, organizational 
learning, and performance. Journal of Business Research. 64, 408-417. 
Kim, E.-S. & Song, Y.-I. 2007. Behavioural additionality of R&D evaluation: 
Empirical evidence from Korea Public R&D Program. Portland, Oregon: 
Portland International Centre for Management of Engineering and 
Technology.  2247-2250. 
Kleer, R. 2010. Government R&D subsidies as a signal for private 
investors. Research Policy. 39(10), 1361-1374. 
Klette, T. J. & Johansen, F. 1998. Accumulation of R&D capital and 
dynamic firm performance: a Not-so-fixed Effect Model. Annales de 
Economie et de Statistique. 49-50, 389-419. 
Knockaert, M., Spithoven, A. & Clarysse, B. 2013. The impact of 
technology intermediaries on firm cognitive capacity additionality. 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change. 81, 376-387. 
Laursen, K. & Salter, A. 2006. Open for Innovation: The role of openness in 
explaining innovation performance among UK manufacturing firms. 
Strategic Management Journal. 27, 131-150. 
  
 
The legacy of public subsidies for innovation 
 
 47 
Leiponen, A. 2005. Skills and innovation. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization. 23, 303-323. 
Leiponen, A. & Helfat, C. E. 2010. Innovation objectives, knowledge 
sources, and the benefits of breadth. Strategic Management Journal. 31, 
224-236. 
Leiponen, A. & Helfat, C. E. 2011. Location, Decentralization, and 
Knowledge Sources for Innovation. Organization Science. 22, 641-658. 
Licht, G. 2003. The role of additionality in Evaluation of Public R&D 
Programmes. In: 11th TAFTIE Seminar on Additionality: Making Public 
Money Make a Difference, 24-25 November, Vienna.  
Love, J. H. & Roper, S. 2001. Networking and innovation success: a 
comparison of UK, German and Irish companies. Research Policy. 30, 643-
661. 
Love, J. H. & Roper, S. 2005. Innovation, productivity and growth: an 
analysis of Irish data. EARIE Annual Congress 1-4 September, Porto, 
Portugal. 
Love, J.H, Roper, S. & Vahter, P. 2013. Learning from openness: The 
dynamics of breadth in external innovation linkages. Strategic Management 
Journal. DOI: 10.1002/smj.2170. ISSN 0143-2095 (In Press). 
Luukkonen, T. 2000. Additionality of EU Framework Programmes. 
Research Policy. 29, 711-724. 
Martin, S. & Scott, J. T. 2000. The nature of innovation market failure and 
the design of public support for private innovation. Research Policy. 29, 
437-447. 
Meuleman, M. & De Maeseneire, W. 2012. Do R&D subsidies affect SMEs' 
access to external financing? Research Policy. 41, 580-591. 
 
The legacy of public subsidies for innovation 
 
 48 
Mugdh, M. & Pilla, S. 2011. A conceptual framework for achieving balance 
between innovation and resilience in optimizing emergency department 
operations. The Health Care Manager. 30, 352-60. 
Newstrom, J.W. 1983. The management of unlearning: Exploding the 
‘‘clean slate’’ fallacy. Training and Development Journal. 37, 8, 36. 
Norrman, C. & Bager-Sjogren, L. 2010. Entrepreneurship policy to support 
new innovative ventures: Is it effective? International Small Business 
Journal. 28, 602-619. 
O'Malley, E., Roper, S. & Hewitt-Dundas, N. 2008. High growth and 
innovation with low R&D: The case of Ireland. In: Edquist, C. & Hommen, L. 
eds. Small country innovation systems: globalization, change and policy in 
Asia and Europe. Edward Elgar Publishers. 
Georghiou, L. & Clarysse,  B. 2006. Introduction and Synthesis. In: 
Government R&D funding and company behaviour: Measuring Behavioural 
Additionality. OECD. 
Pasche, M. & Magnusson, M. 2011. Continuous innovation and 
improvement of product platforms. International Journal of Technology 
Management. 56, 256-271. 
Powell, W. W. 1998. Learning from collaboration: Knowledge and networks 
in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. California Management 
Review. 40, 228-240. 
Powell, W., Kogut, K. & Smith-Doerr, L. 1996. Interorganizational 
collaboration and the locus of innovation: Networks of learning in 
biotechnology. Administrative Science Quarterly. 41, 116-145. 
Raymond, W., Mohnen, P., Palm, F. & van der Loeff, S. S. 2010. 
Persistence of innovation in Dutch manufacturing: Is it spurious? Review of 
Economics and Statistics. 92, 495-504. 
 
The legacy of public subsidies for innovation 
 
 49 
Reiner, C. 2011. Evaluating innovation policies by chance? The case for 
randomised R&D-programme evaluation. Plattform - Forschungs- und 
Technologieevaluierung. 37, 15-28. 
Roper, S. 1998. Public support for near-market R&D: the Northern Ireland 
experience. Regional Studies. 32, 295-299. 
Roper, S. 2009. Stepping forwards – Northern Ireland’s innovation future. 
London: NESTA. 
Roper, S. & Anderson, J. 2000. Innovation and e-commerce: A cross-
border comparison of Irish manufacturing plants. Belfast. 
Roper, S., Ashcroft, B., Love, J.H., Dunlop, S., Hofmann, H. & Vogler-
Ludwig, K. 1996. Product Innovation and Development in UK, German and 
Irish Manufacturing. Queen's University of Belfast/University of 
Strathclyde/Info Institut. 
Roper, S. & Hewitt-Dundas, N. 1998. Innovation, networks and the 
diffusion of manufacturing best practice: A comparison of Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland. Belfast: NIERC. 
Roper, S. & Hewitt-Dundas, N. 2008. Innovation persistence: Survey and 
case-study evidence. Research Policy. 37, 149-162. 
Roper, S. Hewitt-Dundas, N & Love, J.H. 2004. An ex ante evaluation 
framework for the regional benefits of publicly supported R&D projects. 
Research Policy. 33, 487-509. 
Sakakibara, M. 1997. Evaluating government sponsored R&D consortia in 
Japan; who benefits and why? Research Policy. 26, 447-473. 
  
 
The legacy of public subsidies for innovation 
 
 50 
Schoening, N. C., Souder, W. E., Lee, J. & Cooper, R. 1998. The influence 
of government science and technology policies on new product 
development in the U.S.A., U.K., South Korea and Taiwan. International 
Journal of Technology Management. 15, 821-835. 
Technology Strategy Board. 2013. Accelerating innovation and growth: 
Pilot SME growth programme - formative evaluation. . Swindon: T.S. 
Board. 
Todd, M. 2010. Recession as the mother of innovation. Solid State 
Technology. 53, 24-24. 
Trajtenberg, M. 2001. Innovation in Israel 1968-1997: a comparative 
analysis using patent data. Research Policy. 30, 363-389. 
Woolthuis, R. K., Lankhuizen, M. & Gilsing, V. 2005. A system failure 
framework for innovation policy design. Technovation. 25, 609-619. 
Zahra, S. A. & George, G. 2002. Absorptive Capacity: A Review 
Reconceptualization and Extension. Academy of Management Review. 27, 
185-203. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The legacy of public subsidies for innovation 
 
 51  
Centre Manager  
Enterprise Research Centre 
Aston Business School  
Birmingham, B1 7ET 
Enquiries@enterpriseresearch.ac.uk 
Centre Manager  
Enterprise Research Centre 
Warwick Business School  
Coventry, CV4 7AL 
Enquiries@enterpriseresearch.ac.uk 
The Enterprise Research Centre is an independent research centre funded by 
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC); the Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills (BIS); the Technology Strategy Board (TSB); and, through the British 
Bankers Association (BBA), by the Royal Bank of Scotland PLC; Bank of Scotland PLC; 
HSBC Bank PLC; Barclays Bank PLC and Lloyds TSB Bank PLC. 
 
 
